4th Circuit rules CMPD ‘seized’ defendant by parking near him

A split 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals panel has thrown out a federal gun conviction after determining that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police “seized” the defendant when they parked their vehicles near him.

The split 2-1 decision Wednesday vacated Kevin Damon Williams’ conviction on a charge of firearm possession by a felon.

“This case arises from an encounter between police officers and a man seated in a parked car,” Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin wrote for the 4th Circuit majority. “It raises two questions under the Fourth Amendment: whether that encounter was a seizure and, if so, whether the seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. For the following reasons, we hold that a seizure occurred and that it was not supported by reasonable suspicion.”

Williams and two friends were sitting in a parked car near an apartment complex pool when two CMPD officers drove up to them. An anonymous 911 call had alerted authorities to a possible drug deal, according to the court opinion.

One officer stopped his vehicle “in the middle of the roadway, perpendicular to and partially in front of Williams’ car.” The police vehicle was “approximately 15 feet in front of Williams’ car.” A second police vehicle “stopped a few yards behind” the first officer.

“After stopping, the officers exited their vehicles and immediately smelled the odor of marijuana,” Benjamin wrote. “They then approached the vehicle and made contact with Williams and the other occupants. When asked about the odor, Williams admitted that he and the others had smoked the marijuana.”

“Based on the odor and Williams’ admission,” officers ordered all occupants out of the car. A search of the car led to the handgun that produced the federal charge against Williams.

“Williams moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his car, arguing that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they stopped their vehicles in front of him,” Benjamin wrote. “To Williams, the officers, at that moment, seized him without reasonable suspicion.”

US District Judge Robert Conrad rejected Williams’ argument. But the 4th Circuit majority reversed Conrad’s decision.

“Williams argues that he was seized when the officers stopped their cars in the roadway because a reasonable person in Williams’ position would not have felt free to leave,” Benjamin wrote. “Williams further argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify such a seizure.”

The 4th Circuit majority agreed that Williams was “‘blocked in’ because a reasonable person would not have felt free to attempt his available means to exit,” Benjamin explained.

“In addition to being blocked in, the officers’ conduct would suggest to a reasonable person in Williams’ position that he was the subject of an investigation and not free to leave,” she added.

“Parking perpendicular to Williams’ car in the middle roadway inherently sent a message of seizure to Williams,” Benjamin wrote. “This is especially true because there were several open parking spaces that the officers could have used. Each of these factors would indicate to a reasonable person that he was the subject of police investigation and therefore not free to leave.”

“Accordingly, we conclude that Williams was seized when the officers stopped their cars in the roadway,” Benjamin added.

The 4th Circuit rejected the government’s arguments that an “anonymous 911 call and the presence in a high crime area” gave officers a reasonable suspicion justifying their seizure of Williams.

“[T]he tip here was unreliable because it lacked predictive information, details to suggest firsthand observation of criminal activity, or any indication of urgency,” Benjamin wrote. “The tip therefore deserves little weight in the totality of the circumstances. Holding otherwise would allow officers to seize individuals based on nothing more than a vague accusation relayed through 911.”

“Based on this court’s prior pronouncements regarding presence in a high-crime area, the fact that the events here took place in an area known to the officers for crime deserves little weight in the totality of the circumstances,” she added.

“Even combining all the factors identified by the Government, we find that there was not reasonable suspicion that Williams was engaged in criminal activity,” Benjamin wrote. “The officers lacked specific indicators linking Williams or the other occupants of the Mercedes to drug dealing.”

Judge Stephanie Thacker joined Benjamin’s decision. Both were appointed by Democratic presidents. Judge Allison Jones Rushing, a Republican appointee, dissented.

The trial judge concluded that police “did not seize Williams during the two seconds between when the Officers parked their vehicles near Williams’s car and when they opened their doors and smelled the marijuana Williams had been smoking,” Rushing wrote. “I would affirm that well-supported conclusion.”

“Here, the Officers had probable cause to search Williams’s car as soon as Officer Pistone opened the door of his patrol vehicle and smelled marijuana; therefore, whether an unreasonable seizure occurred turns solely on how the Officers approached the parking lot and parked their police cruisers,” Rushing explained. “Viewing the totality of the circumstances and construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, no seizure occurred.”

“[T]he location of the patrol vehicles did not constitute a liberty-restraining show of authority against anyone, much less Williams in particular,” the dissent added. “The Officers parked in the two-lane roadway adjacent to an apartment building, leaving the subject of their visit unclear. They did not single out Williams by parking directly in front of, or flanking both sides of, his vehicle specifically.”

“The Officers could have been responding to a call from one of the apartment buildings or to a call about any of the five cars parked in the row near the police cruisers — perhaps a reported vehicle break-in, for example,” Rushing wrote. “While Williams and the majority place dispositive emphasis on the Officers’ parking job, the location of the police cruisers did not communicate to any reasonable person in the parking lot or the apartment complex that they were not free to go about their business.”

“In reaching a different conclusion, the majority appears to adopt a new legal standard.” Rushing warned. “The majority reasons that officers have seized a car and its occupants unless it is ‘“readily apparent” that there [is] “more than enough room” … to drive away without any “special maneuvering.”’”

“It is not sufficient, apparently, that a reasonable person would feel free to drive away, or that he could drive away without any special maneuvering,” the dissent continued. “Nor is it sufficient even that a reasonable person had enough room to drive away without special maneuvering — he must have ‘more than enough room.’ But even that does not suffice. Rather, officers must make it ‘readily apparent’ that all of this is the case.”

“Construed in the light most favorable to the Government, the facts confirm the district court’s conclusion that, at the time of the Officers’ arrival, a reasonable person in Williams’s situation would consider himself free to leave the parking lot unconstrained by any individualized show of police authority,” Rushing concluded. “Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Williams’s motion to suppress.”

“4th Circuit rules CMPD ‘seized’ defendant by parking near him” was originally published on www.carolinajournal.com.