NC Appeals Court rules for Winston-Salem in animal sanctuary dispute

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled in favor of Winston-Salem in the city’s dispute with the Fairytale Farm animal sanctuary. Farm owner Kimberly Dunckel had argued that the city violated her constitutional rights when it blocked the sanctuary’s operations in 2023.

A unanimous three-judge Appeals Court panel issued an opinion Wednesday upholding a trial judge’s February 2025 ruling favoring the city.

“Essentially, the trial court concluded that the City of Winston-Salem (the ‘City’) did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by prohibiting Plaintiffs from operating an animal sanctuary on property zoned by the City as residential. We conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and affirm,” wrote Chief Judge Chris Dillon.

Dillon and fellow Judges Julee Flood and Chris Freeman agreed that Dunckel and Fairytale Farm had legal standing to file suit against the city. But the panel rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that blocking the animal sanctuary violated Dunckel’s state constitutional rights under the “fruits of their labor,” “law of the land,” and equal protection clauses. Dunckel worked with lawyers from the Institute for Justice.

The Appeals Court opinion pointed to Winston-Salem’s uniform development ordinances. “Defendants’ purpose in preventing certain commercial uses in those [residential] districts is to ‘preserve the residential character of neighborhoods to promote health, safety, and general welfare,’” Dillon wrote.

“By regulating and preventing Plaintiffs’ commercial use in Plaintiffs’ neighborhood, Defendants’ goal of preserving the residential character of RS-9 districts is achieved,” he added. “By hosting events — some of which required guests to pay for tickets and others that hosted several hundred guests — and operating the nonprofit as Plaintiffs did previously and seek to do in the future, Plaintiffs have engaged and will engage in a non-residential, commercial use.”

“Stated differently, by virtue of operating the nonprofit, a commercial entity, Plaintiffs are altering the residential nature of their RS-9 neighborhood,” Dillon wrote. “And by enforcing the UDO in this case, Defendants worked to preserve the character and integrity of the specific RS-9 district’s residential character by eliminating a commercial use from the district. In light of this, Defendants’ enforcement is very effective at achieving their ‘desired public purpose.’”

Winston-Salem opposed the animal sanctuary “at Plaintiff Dunckel’s property,” Dillon noted. “Plaintiffs are further burdened because moving the Sanctuary to another location would be costly. Despite this burden, however, uncontroverted facts also indicate that Plaintiffs’ animal sanctuary, whether classified as an animal shelter or as an indoor or outdoor kennel, would be permitted in certain commercial and industrial districts. Thus, while Plaintiffs are burdened, Defendants have not prohibited Plaintiffs from operating at all, but rather only in certain zoning districts.”

“When a claimant asserts their fundamental right to earn a living has been infringed, the applicable Fruits of Their Labor and Law of the Land test does not require that the means be the best method of achieving the state’s goal; rather, the means chosen must be ‘reasonably necessary,’” Dillon explained. “We believe that, in light of other options, it was reasonable for Defendants to prevent the operation of the Sanctuary at Plaintiff Dunckel’s property.”

“While burdensome to Plaintiffs, enforcement here aids in Defendants’ accomplishment of their goal,” the Appeals Court explained. “By permitting Plaintiffs to operate as they previously did, potentially having hundreds of guests present at Plaintiffs’ property on a single day, or even permitting Plaintiffs to operate at a much smaller scale (as Plaintiffs seek to do now), Defendants would still be allowing an otherwise unauthorized commercial use within a RS-9 zoning district, thereby frustrating their ultimate goal.”

“We also note that Defendants’ enforcement of the UDO is not the same as state action described in other Fruits of Their Labor and Law of the Land cases in which the opinions draw a distinction between government action regulating a business and instances where the government excludes or prohibits individuals from engaging in a business altogether,” Dillon added.

“[A]lthough Plaintiffs are burdened, they are not burdened to the point of out-right prohibition,” he wrote. “Nor is there a system in place that works to exclude Plaintiffs from the animal sanctuary business: Defendants have told Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs are unable to operate at Plaintiff Dunckel’s property, Defendants have not told Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs are forbidden from operating at all.”

Dillon cited the impact of the state Supreme Court’s 1949 decision in Kinney v. Sutton. The high court upheld a city zoning ordinance that banned commercial operations in a residential district while allowing “religious uses, educational uses, social uses, small scale agricultural uses, health care uses,” and other nonconforming activities.

“Relevant here, despite not being a case that involved the fundamental right to earn a living, Kinney instructs this Court that a zoning ordinance may still be ‘aptly phrased to secure [its] object’ by establishing and preserving a ‘restricted residential district free from substantial commercial and industrial activities’ even though certain non-residential uses are permitted with the residential district,” Dillon explained. “What this means for Plaintiffs’ case is the fact that some non-residential uses are permitted does not render the statute unconstitutional — the ordinance’s purpose is still being achieved.”

After addressing claims involving Dunckel’s right to earn a living, the Appeals rejected her equal protection claim. “Defendants’ action does not offend Article I, Section 19’s Equal Protection Clause,” Dillon wrote.

“Essentially, Plaintiffs compare themselves to three different groups: (1) residents with personal pets, (2) home day care centers, and (3) schools and churches,” he added. “We conclude it was reasonable to differentiate between Plaintiffs and the listed groups.”

“With respect to the first group, the difference is readily apparent, and as a result, there is a ‘reasonable distinction,’” Dillon explained. “While residents with ‘personal pets’ may have the same type and theoretically the same number of animals as Plaintiffs, those residents are not engaging in a non-residential, commercial use like Plaintiffs.”

“As to groups two and three, it is conceivable that, despite seeking to maintain the district’s residential character, certain uses which are integral to residential life should still be permitted,” the Appeals Court opinion continued. “Schools, places of worship, and home day care centers are all integral to the everyday lives of residents, and thus it is reasonable for these uses to be permitted. Notably, two of these uses are also protected by our state constitution’s Declaration of Rights.”

The ruling arrived less than two months after the appellate panel heard oral arguments in the case on Feb. 11.

“NC Appeals Court rules for Winston-Salem in animal sanctuary dispute” was originally published on www.carolinajournal.com.